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Abstract 
This article explores if there are common symptoms and steps to international financial crises by 
examining the causes and progress of financial crisis in Latin America and South East Asia. The symptoms 
are a currency crisis, a banking crisis, a sovereign debt crisis and a balance of payments crisis. It 
will also attempt to the question as to what is the relative responsibility of the center and the 
periphery of the international financial system in the genesis of crises. 
 
The international financial crises that hit a number of emerging countries from the mid-1990s are 
sometimes seen as a pathology associated with financial globalization. It should then be a contagious 
disease, when one considers the speed with which the crisis has spread from one country to another. At 
the level of a given country, the symptoms are as follows: 
1) a currency crisis; 
2) a banking crisis; 
3) a sovereign debt crisis; 
4) a balance of payments crisis (capital flight). 
All four of these symptoms are sometimes present (as in the current Argentine crisis), but this is 
not always the case. Southeast Asian countries, for example, did not have a sovereign debt 
crisis (Kirrane 2017), and Brazil did not have a banking crisis sovereign debt declared in 1998. 
The only truly common denominator of international financial crises is the concomitance of a 
currency crisis and capital flight in several countries. 
International financial crises have inspired literature abundant. There is a first surge in literacy 
following the Mexican crisis of 1994-1995, followed by a real explosion from 1998, at the time 
of the crisis in Southeast Asia. The purpose of this article is to give an overview of the main 
themes developed in the theoretical part of this literature. The international financial crises 
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have given rise to divergent interpretations, which sometimes have implications very different 
in terms of economic policy and reform of the international financial system. 
This article provides a brief personal overview of what research theoretical on international 
financial crises has taught us, and directions it might follow in the future. This is not an 
exhaustive review of the literature. In particular, I omit mentioning contributions that are 
sometimes important, but which are not easily related to the themes I chose to discuss. The 
reader will find more complete reviews of the literature for example in Cartapanis (2002) or 
Allen et al (2002). 
The concept of "contagion" is generally used with reference to the international spread of 
crises. But this concept can also be useful to think about the generalization of the crisis at the 
domestic level as when, for example, a sovereign debt crisis degenerates into a banking crisis in 
a given country. The mechanisms of contagion domestic explain the generalization of the crisis 
at the level of a country rather than its spread from one country to another. Domestic 
contagion explains why crises of different kinds tend to arise together at the level of a given 
country, in an international financial crisis. 
The observation of recent crises suggests a number of channels of contagion, and the 
theoretical literature offers us several ways to model them. Some of these mechanisms are 
reviewed below. 
Currency crisis 
Foreign exchange rate crisis has different effects depending on whether one places oneself 
before the devaluation, when the authorities still resist speculation, or after the devaluation 
(Kirrane 2018). Before the devaluation, the rise in the interest rate weakens the banks and 
increases the servicing of the public debt (Obstfeld, 1994). Devaluation in turn causes problems 
if agents domestic (banks, companies, state) are indebted in currency foreign and have not 
hedged their foreign exchange risk, a problem currency mismatch that is endemic in emerging 
economies. 
Devaluation reduces the net wealth of the indebted agent, leading to a crisis debt rollover if, 
moreover, its debt is short-term, as in the banking crisis models of Burnside et al (2001, 2002) 
or Jeanne and Wyplosz (2001). The erosion of wealth net can also lead to credit rationing for 
firms domestic or the state, as in the models of Aghion et al (2000, 2001), Céspedes et al 
(2002), Jeanne and Zettelmeyer (2002), Krugman (1999). 
In general, the stabilizing power of monetary policy is reduced when domestic agents are 
indebted in foreign currency (Aghion et al., 2000; Bacchetta 2000; Jeanne and Wyplosz 2001). 
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Authorities are caught in a dilemma between raising high interest rates and allowing the 
currency to depreciate, two options that are both damaging to the economy. 
Bank crisis  
As Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) show in their study of the "twin crises", the association 
between the currency crisis and the banking crisis does not date from the Asian crisis. The links 
between the banking crisis and the crisis currency are modeled in a number of recent articles. 
At Chang and Velasco (2000), for example, a run on dollar deposits in domestic banks is 
depleting the central bank's reserves lending as a last resort, causing a currency crisis. The 
authorities may also wish to limit devalue the consequences real of the financial crisis and 
stimulate the economy, (Jeanne and Wyplosz 2001).Moreover, the loss of production caused by 
the banking crisis may imply a depreciation of the equilibrium real exchange rate, which results 
in a currency crisis insofar as no one anticipates that the necessary adjustment will take the 
form of domestic deflation. 
The banking crisis can also degenerate into a sovereign debt crisis since the cost (often very 
high) of bank bailout is financed by government bonds. At Burnside et al (2002), for example, 
the banking crisis raises public debt to levels unsustainable, resulting in a sovereign debt crisis 
that is being resolved into monetization. 
Sovereign debt crisis 
Authorities may be tempted to solve the public debt crisis through monetization, which puts 
pressure on the exchange rate (Obstfeld 1994, Burnside et al2002). In addition, the decline in 
the price of government bonds is weakening the banking system if domestic banks hold a large 
amount of public debt (as was the case in Argentina). The sovereign default gives the bad name 
country a(Cole and Kehoe, 1998); it can thus cause fear of expropriation and capital flight. 
Capital flight 
It seems obvious that a currency crisis, a banking crisis or sovereign debt causes a flight of 
capital. This should not make us forget that, on the other hand, the flight of capital is in itself a 
source of problems. In particular, a capital flight reduces domestic demand, which weakens all 
domestic agents at once - businesses and households, the banks that lent them, and the state 
that sees its tax revenues decrease2. Paradoxically, the negative impact of capital flight on 
domestic demand is an issue that has been relatively neglected in the theoretical literature. 
A Keynesian theory of international financial crises (as opposed to the more Fischerian models 
of which there are many examples in the recent literature) remains to be developed (Calvo, 
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1998). The multiplicity and reciprocity of causalities has two consequences. First, these 
mechanisms propagation amplify the impact of exogenous shocks. A localized shock can cause a 
generalized crisis after reverberating throughout the economy. In a large international mobility 
capital environment, emerging economies are weakened by the vulnerabilities of their own, 
including financial structures often marked by short-term debt and currency foreign and 
macroeconomic policies that suffer a chronic deficit of credibility. 
Secondly, emerging countries may be vulnerable to pure anticipation shocks. The new models 
of financial crises international generically have multiple equilibria due to multiple circularity 
(this is the case for example of Burnside et al, 2002; Jeanne and Wyplosz, 2001; 
Schneider and Tornell, 2001). For example, speculative access to the domestic currency can 
trigger a chain reaction That justifies a posteriori investor anxiety and further speculation. We 
can also imagine a scenario where investors panicked withdraw their capital and thereby create 
the problems they feared. This type of circularity can make emerging countries vulnerable to 
changes in market sentiment without real economic fundamentals. Capital mobility contributes 
to this problem, as it makes capital flows very sensitive to changes in expectations. 
Emerging-country crises tend to spread rapidly from one country to another, sometimes 
between countries with very little in common, as in the case of the contagion of Russia to Brazil 
in 1983. This type of contagion seems difficult to explain purely by commercial links or by an 
objective analogy between the countries affected by the crisis. It seems to imply a systemic 
fragility. 
The international contagion can be interpreted first of all from the domestic fragilities I 
mentioned earlier, which are also systemic insofar as they are made possible by an 
international financial system characterized by a great mobility of capital. Given that the 
economies of emerging countries are vulnerable to small shocks, the crisis can spread from one 
to the other without necessarily having a link very strong mechanical between them. The limit 
of this reasoning is reached with the models of multiple equilibria. The contagion can then be 
explained as the simultaneous passage of the good equilibrium to the bad equilibrium in several 
countries which would have nothing else in common except to be vulnerable to self-fulfilling 
speculation (Masson, 1999). 
Another approach, proposed in particular by Guillermo Calvo, tries to explain the international 
contagion through more financial channels. According to this approach, international financial 
centers can spread the crisis between countries on the periphery of the system, or even be an 
autonomous source of shocks. Foreign investors tend to group emerging countries into the 
same risk class, and do not necessarily engage in a detailed country-by-country risk analysis 
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(Calvo and Mendoza, 2000). In this context, bad news about one country can negatively affect 
other countries belonging to the same class, even if they have little in common. Calvo (1999) 
presents a model of the contagion of the Russian crisis in Brazil based on a different 
mechanism. Investors must sell bonds Brazilian, following losses on their Russian bonds. This 
lowers the price of Brazilian bonds, causing a crisis in Brazil. Wall Street could be, not only a 
vector of propagation, but also a source of shocks. Capital flows to emerging markets are 
characterized by dynamics boom and bust that are difficult to justify in terms of economic 
fundamentals, a phenomenon that can be seen in many other markets financial. Thus, Wall 
Street could be a source of correlated shocks between countries that have nothing in common 
other than belonging to the same risk class. Where do these dynamics come from boom and 
bust, and how should economic policies respond to them, are still poorly understood issues. 
Do economists understand international financial crises? This article has been able to suggest 
that theorists do not lack assumptions about the factors of vulnerability, the shocks at the 
origin of crises, and the mechanisms involved in their propagation. Some assumptions have 
received special attention in efforts recent modeling (the link between the currency crisis and 
the banking crisis, in particular). Other mechanisms deserve more attention in future research (I 
think, in particular, the link between capital flight and domestic demand, and the phenomenon 
boom-bust inflows Capital to emerging countries). 
Understanding the essence of international financial crises, involves going however, beyond 
conjecture. First, one may ask, which are really essential, in the sense that they would be much 
more than the others, which would determine the form of financial crises we observe. Another 
question is what is the relative responsibility of the center and the periphery of the 
international financial system in the genesis of crises. 
The empirical literature on international financial crises is instructive on many aspects of the 
crisis, but it does not establish a consensus in response to these issues. These questions are 
crucial when it comes to thinking about crisis management or the reform of the "international 
financial architecture". There is of course some correspondence between the diagnosis of crises 
and the recommended remedies. If one thinks that speculation against fixed exchange rate 
regimes is a decisive factor in triggering international financial crises, it is natural to base one's 
hopes on the adoption of more exchange rate regimes flexible by emerging countries. This is 
the direction in which has the discourse of the International Financial Institutions evolved 
(Fischer, 2001). If, on the other hand, the origin of the crises is attributed to budgetary 
imbalances or bank weaknesses, we will recommend to the emerging countries an increased 
rigor in their budgetary policy and their banking regulation.  
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Finally, if we believe in an intrinsic instability of international capital flows, the application, even 
rigorous, of previous recommendations may not be enough to protect emerging countries from 
international financial crises - and it would be difficult to avoid seek the solution on the side of 
restrictions in the mobility of capital. The correct way to look at the problem may be a 
combination of the previous approaches, but then the question is how to prioritize. It is hoped 
that research on international financial crises will progress in order to base the study of these 
issues on an empirical basis more solid. 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
AGHION P., BACCHETTA P. and BANERJEE A. (2000), A Simple Model of Monetary Policy and 
Currency Crises, European Economic Review 44, pp. 728-738. 
 
AGHION P., BACCHETTA P. and BANERJEE A. (2001), Currency Crises and Monetary Policy in an 
Economy with Credit Constraints,  European Economic Review -1150. 
 
ALLEN M., ROSENBERG C., KELLER C., SETSER B. and ROUBINI N. (2002), A Balance Sheet 
Approach to Financial Crisis, IMF Working Paper 02/210. 
 
BACCHETTA P., (2000), Monetary Policy with Foreign Currency Debt, mimeo, Study Center 
Gerzensee, February. 
BUITER W., CORSETTI G. e and PESENTI P. (1998), Interpreting The ERM Crisis: Country-Specific 
and Systemic Issues, Princeton Studies In International Finance No.4. 
 
BURNSIDE C., EICHENBAUM M. and REBELO S. (2001), Prospective Deficits and the Asian 
Currency Crisis, Journal of Political Economy vol. 109(6), pp. 1155-97. 
 
BURNSIDE C., EICHENBAUM M. and REBELO S. 2001, Hedging and Financial Fragility in Fixed 
Exchange Rate Regimes, European Economic Review Vol. 45, No7, pp. 1151-93. 
 
CALVO G., (1998), Capital Flows and Capital-Market Crises: the Simple Economics of Sudden 
Stops, Journal of Applied Economics, vol.I, No1, pp. 35-54. 
 
CALVO G., (1999), Contagion in Emerging Markets: when Wall Street is a carrier, mimo, 
University du Maryland, Department of Economics. 
 
CALVO G., and  MENDOZA E. (2000), Rational Contagion and the Globalization of Securities 
Markets, Journal of International Economics, 79-113. 
Batista – Identifying the symptoms of financial crises   
 
 
84 
 
 
CARTAPANIS A., (2002), Le déclenchement des crises de change: qu’avons-nous appris depuis 
dix ans?, à paraître dans Économie Internationale. 
 
CESPEDES L. F., CHANG R., and  VELASCO A. (2002), Dollarization of Liabilities, Net Worth Effects 
and Optimal Monetary Policy in Sebastian Edwards et Jeffrey A. Frankel (eds.), Preventing 
Currency Crises in Emerging Markets, NBER Conference Report, Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, pp. 559-600. 
 
CHANG R. and VELASCO A. (2000), Liquidity Crises in Emerging Markets: Theory and Policy, in 
NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1999, Ben S. Bernanke et Julio Rotemberg (eds.), Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
 
COLE H. R. and KEHOE P. J. (1998), Models of Sovereign Debt: Partial versus General 
Reputation, International Economic Review vol. 39 (1), 55-70. 
 
EICHENGREEN B. and HAUSMANN R. (1999), Exchange Rates and Financial Fragility, NBER 
Working Paper No7418. 
 
FISCHER S., (2001), Exchange Rate Regimes: Is the Bipolar View Correct?, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives vol. 15, No2. 
 
JEANNE O., (2002), Why Do Emerging Economies Borrow in Foreign Currency?, presented at the 
conference Currency and Maturity Mismatching: Redeeming Debt From Original Sin, Banque 
interaméricaine de développement (Washington D.C.) 
 
JEANNE O., and WYPLOSZ C. (2001), The International Lender of Last Resort: How Large is Large 
 
Managing Currency Crises in Emerging Markets, The University of Chicago Press. 
 
JEANNE O., and ZETTELMEYER J. (2002), Original Sin, Balance Sheet Crises and the Role of 
International Lending, IMF Working Paper 02/234. 
 
KAMINSKY G.L. and REINHART C.M. (1999), The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and 
Balance-of-Payments Problems, American Economic Review vol.89 No3, 473-500. 
 
KIRRANE C., (2017), Looking Back to the Asian Crisis; lessons for the IMF,  Asian Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 7, pp. 58-67 
 
KIRRANE C., (2018), The Causes of the Asian Currency Crisis,  Asian Journal of Political Economy, 
Vol. 8, pp. 107-117 
 
Batista – Identifying the symptoms of financial crises   
 
 
85 
 
KODRES L. and  PRITSKER M. (2002), A Rational Expectations Model of Financial Contagion, 
Journal of Finance vol. 57 No2, 768-99. 
 
KRUGMAN R., (1999), Balance Sheets, The Transfer Problem, and Financial Crises in Peter Isard, 
Assaf Razin, and  Andrew K. Rose (eds.), International Finance and Financial Crises: Essays in 
Honor of Robert P. Flood, Jr., Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, pp. 31-44. 
 
MARTIN P., and REY H. (2002), Financial Globalization and Emerging Markets: With or Without 
Crash?, NBER Working Paper No9288. 
 
MASSON P., (1999), Contagion: Macroeconomic Models with Multiple Equilibria, Journal of 
International Money and Finance vol. 18(4), pp. 587-602. 
 
OBSTFELD M., (1994), The Logic of Currency Crises, Cahiers Économiques et Monétaires, No43, 
pp. 189-213. 
 
SCHNEIDER M. and TORNELL A. (2001), Boom Bust Cycles and the Balance Sheet Effect mimeo 
(revised version of Balance Sheet Effects, Bailout Guarantees, and Financial Crises NBER 
Working Paper No8060). 
 
SUMMERS L., (2000), International Financial Crises: Causes, Prevention, and Cures, American 
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings of the 112th Annual Meeting of the American 
Economic Association, 1-16. 
 
TIROLE J., (2002) Financial Crises, Liquidity, and the International Monetary System, Princeton 
University Press. 
 
